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PROBABILITY AGGREGATION IN TIME-SERIES: DYNAMIC
HIERARCHICAL MODELING OF SPARSE EXPERT BELIEFS1
BY VILLE A. SATOPÄÄ, SHANE T. JENSEN, BARBARA A. MELLERS,
PHILIP E. TETLOCK AND LYLE H. UNGAR
University of Pennsylvania
Most subjective probability aggregation procedures use a single prob-
ability judgment from each expert, even though it is common for experts
studying real problems to update their probability estimates over time. This
paper advances into unexplored areas of probability aggregation by consid-
ering a dynamic context in which experts can update their beliefs at random
intervals. The updates occur very infrequently, resulting in a sparse data set
that cannot be modeled by standard time-series procedures. In response to the
lack of appropriate methodology, this paper presents a hierarchical model that
takes into account the expert’s level of self-reported expertise and produces
aggregate probabilities that are sharp and well calibrated both in- and out-
of-sample. The model is demonstrated on a real-world data set that includes
over 2300 experts making multiple probability forecasts over two years on
different subsets of 166 international political events.
1. Introduction. Experts’ probability assessments are often evaluated on cal-
ibration, which measures how closely the frequency of event occurrence agrees
with the assigned probabilities. For instance, consider all events that an expert be-
lieves to occur with a 60% probability. If the expert is well calibrated, 60% of
these events will actually end up occurring. Even though several experiments have
shown that experts are often poorly calibrated [see, e.g., Cooke (1991), Shlyakhter
et al. (1994)], these are noteworthy exceptions. In particular, Wright et al. (1994)
argue that higher self-reported expertise can be associated with better calibration.
Calibration by itself, however, is not sufficient for useful probability estima-
tion. Consider a relatively stationary process, such as rain on different days in a
given geographic region, where the observed frequency of occurrence in the last
10 years is 45%. In this setting an expert could always assign a constant probability
of 0.45 and be well-calibrated. This assessment, however, can be made without any
subject-matter expertise. For this reason the long-term frequency is often consid-
ered the baseline probability—a naive assessment that provides the decision-maker
Received September 2013; revised March 2014.
1Supported by a research contract to the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Cali-
fornia from the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) via the Department of
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very little extra information. Experts should make probability assessments that are
as far from the baseline as possible. The extent to which their probabilities differ
from the baseline is measured by sharpness [Gneiting et al. (2008), Winkler and
Jose (2008)]. If the experts are both sharp and well calibrated, they can forecast
the behavior of the process with high certainty and accuracy. Therefore, useful
probability estimation should maximize sharpness subject to calibration [see, e.g.,
Murphy and Winkler (1987), Raftery et al. (2005)].
There is strong empirical evidence that bringing together the strengths of differ-
ent experts by combining their probability forecasts into a single consensus, known
as the crowd belief, improves predictive performance. Prompted by the many appli-
cations of probability forecasts, including medical diagnosis [Pepe (2003), Wilson
et al. (1998)], political and socio-economic foresight [Tetlock (2005)], and mete-
orology [Baars and Mass (2005), Sanders (1963), Vislocky and Fritsch (1995)],
researchers have proposed many approaches to combining probability forecasts
[see, e.g., Batchelder, Strashny and Romney (2010), Ranjan and Gneiting (2010),
Satopää et al. (2014a) for some recent studies, and Clemen and Winkler (2007),
Genest and Zidek (1986), Primo et al. (2009), Wallsten, Budescu and Erev (1997)
for a comprehensive overview]. The general focus, however, has been on devel-
oping one-time aggregation procedures that consult the experts’ advice only once
before the event resolves.
Consequently, many areas of probability aggregation still remain rather unex-
plored. For instance, consider investors aiming to assess whether a stock index will
finish trading above a threshold on a given date. To maximize their overall predic-
tive accuracy, they may consult a group of experts repeatedly over a period of time
and adjust their estimate of the aggregate probability accordingly. Given that the
experts are allowed to update their probability assessments, the aggregation should
be performed by taking into account the temporal correlation in their advice.
This paper adds another layer of complexity by assuming a heterogeneous set
of experts, most of whom only make one or two probability assessments over the
hundred or so days before the event resolves. This means that the decision-maker
faces a different group of experts every day, with only a few experts returning later
on for a second round of advice. The problem at hand is therefore strikingly dif-
ferent from many time-series estimation problems, where one has an observation
at every time point—or almost every time point. As a result, standard time-series
procedures like ARIMA [see, e.g., Mills (1991)] are not directly applicable. This
paper introduces a time-series model that incorporates self-reported expertise and
captures a sharp and well-calibrated estimate of the crowd belief. The model is
highly interpretable and can be used for the following:
• analyzing under and overconfidence in different groups of experts,
• obtaining accurate probability forecasts, and
• gaining question-specific quantities with easy interpretations, such as expert dis-
agreement and problem difficulty.
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This paper begins by describing our geopolitical database. It then introduces
a dynamic hierarchical model for capturing the crowd belief. The model is esti-
mated in a two-step procedure: first, a sampling step produces constrained param-
eter estimates via Gibbs sampling [see, e.g., Geman and Geman (1984)]; second,
a calibration step transforms these estimates to their unconstrained equivalents via
a one-dimensional optimization procedure. The model introduction is followed by
the first evaluation section that uses synthetic data to study how accurately the
two-step procedure can estimate the crowd belief. The second evaluation section
applies the model to our real-world geopolitical forecasting database. The paper
concludes with a discussion of future research directions and model limitations.
2. Geopolitical forecasting data. Forecasters were recruited from profes-
sional societies, research centers, alumni associations, science bloggers and word
of mouth (n = 2365). Requirements included at least a Bachelor’s degree and com-
pletion of psychological and political tests that took roughly two hours. These
measures assessed cognitive styles, cognitive abilities, personality traits, political
attitudes and real-world knowledge. The experts were asked to give probability
forecasts (to the second decimal point) and to self-assess their level of expertise (on
a 1-to-5 scale with 1 = Not At All Expert and 5 = Extremely Expert) on a number
of 166 geopolitical binary events taking place between September 29, 2011 and
May 8, 2013. Each question was active for a period during which the participating
experts could update their forecasts as frequently as they liked without penalty.
The experts knew that their probability estimates would be assessed for accuracy
using Brier scores.2 This incentivized them to report their true beliefs instead of
attempting to game the system [Winkler and Murphy (1968)]. In addition to re-
ceiving $150 for meeting minimum participation requirements that did not depend
on prediction accuracy, the experts received status rewards for their performance
via leader-boards displaying Brier scores for the top 20 experts. Given that a typi-
cal expert participated only in a small subset of the 166 questions, the experts are
considered indistinguishable conditional on the level of self-reported expertise.
The average number of forecasts made by a single expert in one day was around
0.017, and the average group-level response rate was around 13.5 forecasts per
day. Given that the group of experts is large and diverse, the resulting data set is
very sparse. Tables 1 and 2 provide relevant summary statistics on the data. Notice
that the distribution of the self-reported expertise is skewed to the right and that
some questions remained active longer than others. For more details on the data
set and its collection see Ungar et al. (2012).
To illustrate the data with some concrete examples, Figure 1(a) and 1(b) show
scatterplots of the probability forecasts given for (a) Will the expansion of the Euro-
pean bailout fund be ratified by all 17 Eurozone nations before 1 November 2011?
2The Brier score is the squared distance between the probability forecast and the event indicator
that equals 1.0 or 0.0 depending on whether the event happened or not, respectively. See Brier (1950)
for the original introduction.
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TABLE 1
Five-number summaries of our real-world data
Statistic Min. Q1 Median Mean Q3 Max.
# of days a question is active 4 35.6 72.0 106.3 145.20 418
# of experts per question 212 543.2 693.5 783.7 983.2 1690
# forecasts given by each expert on a question 1 1.0 1.0 1.8 2.0 131
# questions participated by an expert 1 14.0 36.0 55.0 90.0 166
and (b) Will the Nikkei 225 index finish trading at or above 9500 on 30 September
2011? The points have been shaded according to the level of self-reported exper-
tise and jittered slightly to make overlaps visible. The solid line gives the posterior
mean of the calibrated crowd belief as estimated by our model. The surrounding
dashed lines connect the point-wise 95% posterior intervals. Given that the Euro-
pean bailout fund was ratified before November 1, 2011 and that the Nikkei 225
index finished trading at around 8700 on September 30, 2011, the general trend of
the probability forecasts tends to converge toward the correct answers. The indi-
vidual experts, however, sometimes disagree strongly, with the disagreement per-
sisting even near the closing dates of the questions.
3. Model. Let pi,t,k ∈ (0,1) be the probability forecast given by the ith expert
at time t for the kth question, where i = 1, . . . , Ik , t = 1, . . . , Tk , and k = 1, . . . ,K .
Denote the logit probabilities with
Yi,t,k = logit(pi,t,k) = log
(
pi,t,k
1 − pi,t,k
)
∈R
and collect the logit probabilities for question k at time t into a vector Yt,k =
[Y1,t,kY2,t,k · · ·YIk,t,k]T . Partition the experts into J groups based on some indi-
vidual feature, such as self-reported expertise, with each group sharing a common
multiplicative bias term bj ∈ R for j = 1, . . . , J . Collect these bias terms into a
bias vector b = [b1 b2 · · · bJ ]T . Let Mk be a Ik × J matrix denoting the group
memberships of the experts in question k; that is, if the ith expert participating
in the kth question belongs to the j th group, then the ith row of Mk is the j th
standard basis vector ej . The bias vector b is assumed to be identical across all K
TABLE 2
Frequencies of the self-reported expertise (1 = Not At All Expert and 5 = Extremely Expert) levels
across all the 166 questions in our real-world data
Expertise level 1 2 3 4 5
Frequency (%) 25.3 30.7 33.6 8.2 2.1
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FIG. 1. Scatterplots of the probability forecasts given for two questions in our data set. The solid
line gives the posterior mean of the calibrated crowd belief as estimated by our model. The surround-
ing dashed lines connect the point-wise 95% posterior intervals.
questions. Under this notation, the model for the kth question can be expressed as
Yt,k = MkbXt,k + vt,k,(3.1)
Xt,k = γkXt−1,k + wt,k,(3.2)
X0,k ∼N (μ0, σ 20 ),
where (3.1) denotes the observed process, (3.2) shows the hidden process that is
driven by the constant γk ∈ R, and (μ0, σ 20 ) ∈ (R,R+) are hyperparameters fixed
a priori to 0 and 1, respectively. The error terms follow:
vt,k|σ 2k i.i.d.∼ NIk
(
0, σ 2k IIk
)
,
wt,k|τ 2k i.i.d.∼ N
(
0, τ 2k
)
.
Therefore, the parameters of the model are b, σ 2k , γk and τ 2k for k = 1, . . . ,K .
Their prior distributions are chosen to be noninformative, p(b, σ 2k |Xk) ∝ σ 2k and
p(γk, τ
2
k |Xk) ∝ τ 2k .
The hidden state Xt,k represents the aggregate logit probability for the kth event
given all the information available up to and including time t . To make this more
PROBABILITY AGGREGATION IN TIME-SERIES 1261
specific, let Zk ∈ {0,1} indicate whether the event associated with the kth ques-
tion happened (Zk = 1) or did not happen (Zk = 0). If {Ft,k}Tkt=1 is a filtration
representing the information available up to and including a given time point, then
according to our model E[Zk|Ft,k] = P(Zk = 1|Ft,k) = logit−1(Xt,k). Ideally this
probability maximizes sharpness subject to calibration [for technical definitions of
calibration and sharpness see Gneiting and Ranjan (2013), Ranjan and Gneiting
(2010)]. Even though a single expert is unlikely to have access to all the avail-
able information, a large and diverse group of experts may share a considerable
portion of the available information. The collective wisdom of the group therefore
provides an attractive proxy for Ft,k .
Given that the experts may believe in false information, hide their true beliefs or
be biased for many other reasons, their probability assessments should be aggre-
gated via a model that can detect potential bias, separate signal from noise and use
the collective opinion to estimate Xt,k . In our model the experts are assumed to be,
on average, a multiplicative constant b away from Xt,k . Therefore, an individual
element of b can be interpreted as a group-specific systematic bias that labels the
group either as overconfident [bj ∈ (1,∞)] or as underconfident [bj ∈ (0,1)]. See
Section 3 for a brief discussion on different bias structures. Any other deviation
from Xt,k is considered random noise. This noise is measured in terms of σ 2k and
can be assumed to be caused by momentary over-optimism (or pessimism), false
beliefs or other misconceptions.
The random fluctuations in the hidden process are measured by τ 2k and are as-
sumed to represent changes or shocks to the underlying circumstances that ul-
timately decide the outcome of the event. The systematic component γk allows
the model to incorporate a constant signal stream that drifts the hidden process.
If the uncertainty in the question diminishes [γk ∈ (1,∞)], the hidden process
drifts to positive or negative infinity. Alternatively, the hidden process can drift to
zero, in which case any available information does not improve predictive accu-
racy [γk ∈ (0,1)]. Given that all the questions in our data set were resolved within
a prespecified timeframe, we expect γk ∈ (1,∞) for all k = 1, . . . ,K .
As for any future time T ∗ ≥ t ,
XT ∗,k = γ T ∗−tk Xt +
T ∗∑
i=t+1
γ T
∗−i
k wi
∼N
(
γ T
∗−t
k Xt,k, τ
2
k
T ∗∑
i=t+1
γ T
∗−i
k
)
,
the model can be used for time-forward prediction as well. The prediction for the
aggregate logit probability at time T ∗ is given by an estimate of γ T ∗−tXt,k . Nat-
urally the uncertainty in this prediction grows in T . To make such time-forward
predictions, it is necessary to assume that the past population of experts is repre-
sentative of the future population. This is a reasonable assumption because even
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though the future population may consist of entirely different individuals, on aver-
age the population is likely to look very similar to the past population. In practice,
however, social scientists are generally more interested in an estimate of the cur-
rent probability than the probability under unknown conditions in the future. For
this reason, our analysis focuses on probability aggregation only up to the current
time t .
For the sake of model identifiability, it is sufficient to share only one of the
elements of b among the K questions. In this paper, however, all the elements
of b are assumed to be identical across the questions because some of the ques-
tions in our real-world data set involve very few experts with the highest level
of self-reported expertise. The model can be extended rather easily to estimate
bias at a more general level. For instance, by assuming a hierarchical structure
bik ∼ N (bj (i,k), σ 2j (i,k)), where j (i, k) denotes the self-reported expertise of the
ith expert in question k, the bias can be estimated at an individual-level. These es-
timates can then be compared across questions. Individual-level analysis was not
performed in our analysis for two reasons. First, most experts gave only a single
prediction per problem, which makes accurate bias estimation at the individual-
level very difficult. Second, it is unclear how the individually estimated bias terms
can be validated.
If the future event can take upon M > 2 possible outcomes, the hidden state
Xt,k is extended to a vector of size M − 1 and one of the outcomes, for example,
the M th one, is chosen as the base case to ensure that the probabilities will sum
to one at any given time point. Each of the remaining M − 1 possible outcomes
is represented by an observed process similar to (3.1). Given that this multinomial
extension is equivalent to having M − 1 independent binary-outcome models, the
estimation and properties of the model are easily extended to the multi-outcome
case. This paper focuses on binary outcomes because it is the most commonly
encountered setting in practice.
4. Model estimation. This section introduces a two-step procedure, called
Sample-And-Calibrate (SAC), that captures a well-calibrated estimate of the hid-
den process without sacrificing the interpretability of our model.
4.1. Sampling step. Given that (ab,Xt,k/a, a2τ 2k ) = (b,Xt,k, τ 2k ) for any
a > 0 yield the same likelihood for Yt,k , the model as described by (3.1) and (3.2)
is not identifiable. A well-known solution is to choose one of the elements of b,
say, b3, as the reference point and fix b3 = 1. In Section 5 we provide a guideline
for choosing the reference point. Denote the constrained version of the model by
Yt,k = Mkb(1)Xt,k(1) + vt,k,
Xt,k(1) = γk(1)Xt−1,k(1) + wt,k,
vt,k|σ 2k (1) i.i.d.∼ NIk
(
0, σ 2k (1)IIk
)
,
wt,k|τ 2k (1) i.i.d.∼ N
(
0, τ 2k (1)
)
,
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where the trailing input notation, (a), signifies the value under the constraint
b3 = a. Given that this version is identifiable, estimates of the model parameters
can be obtained. Denote the estimates by placing a hat on the parameter symbol.
For instance, bˆ(1) and Xˆt,k(1) represent the estimates of b(1) and Xt,k(1), respec-
tively.
These estimates are obtained by first computing a posterior sample via Gibbs
sampling and then taking the average of the posterior sample. The first step of our
Gibbs sampler is to sample the hidden states via the Forward-Filtering-Backward-
Sampling (FFBS) algorithm. FFBS first predicts the hidden states using a Kalman
filter and then performs a backward sampling procedure that treats these predicted
states as additional observations [see, e.g., Carter and Kohn (1994), Migon et al.
(2005) for details on FFBS]. Given that the Kalman filter can handle varying num-
bers or even no forecasts at different time points, it plays a very crucial role in our
probability aggregation under sparse data.
Our implementation of the sampling step is written in C++ and runs quite
quickly. To obtain 1000 posterior samples for 50 questions each with 100 time
points and 50 experts takes about 215 seconds on a 1.7 GHz Intel Core i5 computer.
See the supplemental article for the technical details of the sampling steps [Satopää
et al. (2014b)] and, for example, Gelman et al. (2003) for a discussion on the
general principles of Gibbs sampling.
4.2. Calibration step. Given that the model parameters can be estimated by
fixing b3 to any constant, the next step is to search for the constant that gives an
optimally sharp and calibrated estimate of the hidden process. This section intro-
duces an efficient procedure that finds the optimal constant without requiring any
additional runs of the sampling step. First, assume that parameter estimates bˆ(1)
and Xˆt,k(1) have already been obtained via the sampling step described in Sec-
tion 4.1. Given that for any β ∈R/{0},
Yt,k = Mkb(1)Xt,k(1) + vt,k
= Mk(b(1)β)(Xt,k(1)/β)+ vt,k
= Mkb(β)Xt,k(β) + vt,k,
we have that b(β) = b(1)β and Xt,k(β) = Xt,k(1)/β . Recall that the hidden pro-
cess Xt,k is assumed to be sharp and well calibrated. Therefore, b3 can be estimated
with the value of β that simultaneously maximizes the sharpness and calibration
of Xˆt,k(1)/β . A natural criterion for this maximization is given by the class of
proper scoring rules that combine sharpness and calibration [Buja, Stuetzle and
Shen (2005), Gneiting et al. (2008)]. Due to the possibility of complete separation
in any one question [see, e.g., Gelman et al. (2008)], the maximization must be
performed over multiple questions. Therefore,
βˆ = arg max
β∈R/{0}
K∑
k=1
Tk∑
t=1
S
(
Zk, Xˆk,t (1)/β
)
,(4.1)
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where Zk ∈ {0,1} is the event indicator for question k. The function S is a strictly
proper scoring rule such as the negative Brier score [Brier (1950)]
SBRI(Z,X) = −(Z − logit−1(X))2
or the logarithmic score [Good (1952)]
SLOG(Z,X) = Z log(logit−1(X))+ (1 − Z) log(1 − logit−1(X)).
The estimates of the unconstrained model parameters are then given by
Xˆt,k = Xˆk,t (1)/βˆ,
bˆ = bˆ(1)βˆ,
τˆ 2k = τˆ 2k (1)/βˆ2,
σˆ 2k = σˆ 2k (1),
γˆk = γˆk(1).
Notice that estimates of σ 2k and γk are not affected by the constraint.
5. Synthetic data results. This section uses synthetic data to evaluate how
accurately the SAC-procedure captures the hidden states and bias vector. The hid-
den process is generated from standard Brownian motion. More specifically, if Zt,k
denotes the value of a path at time t , then
Zk = 1(ZTk,k > 0),
Xt,k = logit
[

(
Zt,k√
Tk − t
)]
gives a sequence of Tk calibrated logit probabilities for the event Zk = 1. A hid-
den process is generated for K questions with a time horizon of Tk = 101. The
questions involve 50 experts allocated evenly among five expertise groups. Each
expert gives one probability forecast per day with the exception of time t = 101
when the event resolves. The forecasts are generated by applying bias and noise to
the hidden process as described by (3.1). Our simulation study considers a three-
dimensional grid of parameter values:
σ 2 ∈ {1/2,1,3/2,2,5/2},
β ∈ {1/2,3/4,1,4/3,2/1},
K ∈ {20,40,60,80,100},
where β varies the bias vector by b = [1/2,3/4,1,4/3,2/1]T β . Forty synthetic
data sets are generated for each combination of σ 2, β and K values. The SAC-
procedure runs for 200 iterations of which the first 100 are used for burn-in.
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TABLE 3
Summary measures of the estimation accuracy under synthetic data.
As EWMA does not produce an estimate of the bias vector, its
accuracy on the bias term cannot be reported
Model Quadratic loss Absolute loss
Hidden process
SACBRI 0.00226 0.0334
SACLOG 0.00200 0.0313
EWMA 0.00225 0.0339
Bias vector
SACBRI 0.147 0.217
SACLOG 0.077 0.171
SAC under the Brier (SACBRI) and logarithm score (SACLOG) are compared
with the Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA). EWMA, which serves
as a baseline, can be understood by first denoting the (expertise-weighted) average
forecast at time t for the kth question with
p¯t,k =
J∑
j=1
ωj
( 1
|Ej |
∑
i∈Ej
pi,t,k
)
,(5.1)
where Ej refers to an index set of all experts in the j th expertise group and ωj
denotes the weight associated with the j th expertise group. The EWMA forecasts
for the kth problem are then constructed recursively from
pˆt,k(α) =
{
p¯1,k, for t = 1,
αp¯t,k + (1 − α)pˆt−1,k(α), for t > 1,
where α and ω are learned from the training set by
(αˆ, ωˆ) = arg min
α,ωj∈[0,1]
K∑
k=1
Tk∑
t=1
(
Zk − pˆt,k(α,ω))2 s.t. J∑
j=1
ωj = 1.
If pt,k = logit−1(Xt,k) and pˆt,k is the corresponding probability estimated by
the model, the model’s accuracy to estimate the hidden process is measured with
the quadratic loss, (pt,k − pˆt,k)2, and the absolute loss, |pt,k − pˆt,k|. Table 3 reports
these losses averaged over all conditions, simulations and time points. The three
competing methods, SACBRI, SACLOG and EWMA, estimate the hidden process
with great accuracy. Based on other performance measures that are not shown for
the sake of brevity, all three methods suffer from an increasing level of noise in the
expert logit probabilities but can make efficient use of extra data.
Some interesting differences emerge from Figure 2 which shows the marginal
effect of β on the average quadratic loss. As can be expected, EWMA performs
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FIG. 2. The marginal effect of β on the average quadratic loss.
well when the experts are, on average, close to unbiased. Interestingly, SAC es-
timates the hidden process more accurately when the experts are overconfident
(large β) compared to underconfident (small β). To understand this result, assume
that the experts in the third group are highly underconfident. Their logit probabil-
ities are then expected to be closer to zero than the corresponding hidden states.
After adding white noise to these expected logit probabilities, they are likely to
cross to the other side of zero. If the sampling step fixes b3 = 1, as it does in our
case, the third group is treated as unbiased and some of the constrained estimates of
the hidden states are likely to be on the other side of zero as well. Unfortunately,
this discrepancy cannot be corrected by the calibration step that is restricted to
shifting the constrained estimates either closer or further away from zero but not
across it. To maximize the likelihood of having all the constrained estimates on the
right side of zero and hence avoiding the discrepancy, the reference point in the
sampling step should be chosen with care. A helpful guideline is to fix the element
of b that is a priori believed to be the largest.
The accuracy of the estimated bias vector is measured with the quadratic loss,
(bj − bˆj )2, and the absolute loss, |bj − bˆj |. Table 3 reports these losses averaged
over all conditions, simulations and elements of the bias vector. Unfortunately,
EWMA does not produce an estimate of the bias vector. Therefore, it cannot be
used as a baseline for the estimation accuracy in this case. Given that the losses for
SACBRI and SACLOG are quite small, they estimate the bias vector accurately.
6. Geopolitical data results. This section presents results for the real-world
data described in Section 2. The goal is to provide application specific insight by
discussing the specific research objectives itemized in Section 1. First, however,
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we discuss two practical matters that must be taken into account when aggregating
real-world probability forecasts.
6.1. Incoherent and imbalanced data. The first matter regards human experts
making probability forecasts of 0.0 or 1.0 even if they are not completely sure of
the outcome of the event. For instance, all 166 questions in our data set contain
both a zero and a one. Transforming such forecasts into the logit space yields in-
finities that can cause problems in model estimation. To avoid this, Ariely et al.
(2000) suggest changing p = 0.00 and 1.00 to p = 0.02 and 0.98, respectively.
This is similar to winsorising that sets the extreme probabilities to a specified per-
centile of the data [see, e.g., Hastings et al. (1947) for more details on winsorising].
Allard, Comunian and Renard (2012), on the other hand, consider only probabili-
ties that fall within a constrained interval, say, [0.001,0.999], and discard the rest.
Given that this implies ignoring a portion of the data, we adopt a censoring ap-
proach similar to Ariely et al. (2000) by changing p = 0.00 and 1.00 to p = 0.01
and 0.99, respectively. Our results remain insensitive to the exact choice of censor-
ing as long as this is done in a reasonable manner to keep the extreme probabilities
from becoming highly influential in the logit space.
The second matter is related to the distribution of the class labels in the data.
If the set of occurrences is much larger than the set of nonoccurrences (or vice
versa), the data set is called imbalanced. On such data the modeling procedure can
end up over-focusing on the larger class and, as a result, give very accurate fore-
cast performance over the larger class at the cost of performing poorly over the
smaller class [see, e.g., Chen (2008), Wallace and Dahabreh (2012)]. Fortunately,
it is often possible to use a well-balanced version of the data. The first step is to
find a partition S0 and S1 of the question indices {1,2, . . . ,K} such that the equal-
ity
∑
k∈S0 Tk =
∑
k∈S1 Tk is as closely approximated as possible. This is equivalent
to an NP-hard problem known in computer science as the Partition Problem: de-
termine whether a given set of positive integers can be partitioned into two sets
such that the sums of the two sets are equal to each other [see, e.g., Hayes (2002),
Karmarkar and Karp (1982)]. A simple solution is to use a greedy algorithm that
iterates through the values of Tk in descending order, assigning each Tk to the sub-
set that currently has the smaller sum [see, e.g., Gent and Walsh (1996), Kellerer,
Pferschy and Pisinger (2004) for more details on the Partition Problem]. After
finding a well-balanced partition, the next step is to assign the class labels such
that the labels for the questions in Sx are equal to x for x = 0 or 1. Recall from
Section 4.2 that Zk represents the event indicator for the kth question. To define a
balanced set of indicators Z˜k for all k ∈ Sx , let
Z˜k = x,
p˜i,t,k =
{1 − pi,t,k, if Zk = 1 − x,
pi,t,k, if Zk = x,
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where i = 1, . . . , Ik , and t = 1, . . . , Tk . The resulting set{(
Z˜k, {p˜i,t,k|i = 1, . . . , Ik, t = 1, . . . , Tk})}Kk=1
is a balanced version of the data. This procedure was used to balance our real-
world data set both in terms of events and time points. The final output splits the
events exactly in half (|S0| = |S1| = 83) such that the number of time points in the
first and second halves are 8737 and 8738, respectively.
6.2. Out-of-sample aggregation. The goal of this section is to evaluate the ac-
curacy of the aggregate probabilities made by SAC and several other procedures.
The models are allowed to utilize a training set before making aggregations on
an independent testing set. To clarify some of the upcoming notation, let Strain
and Stest be index sets that partition the data into training and testing sets of sizes
|Strain| = Ntrain and |Stest| = 166 − Ntrain, respectively. This means that the kth
question is in the training set if and only if k ∈ Strain. Before introducing the com-
peting models, note that all choices of thinning and burn-in made in this section
are conservative and have been made based on pilot runs of the models. This was
done to ensure a posterior sample that has low autocorrelation and arises from a
converged chain. The competing models are as follows:
1. Simple Dynamic Linear Model (SDLM). This is equivalent to the dynamic
model from Section 3 but with b = 1 and β = 1. Thus,
Yt,k = Xt,k + vt,k,
Xt,k = γkXt−1,k + wt,k,
where Xt,k is the aggregate logit probability. Given that this model does not
share any parameters across questions, estimates of the hidden process can be
obtained directly for the questions in the testing set without fitting the model
first on the training set. The Gibbs sampler is run for 500 iterations of which
the first 200 are used for burn-in. The remaining 300 iterations are thinned
by discarding every other observation, leaving a final posterior sample of 150
observations. The average of this sample gives the final estimates.
2. The Sample-And-Calibrate procedure both under the Brier (SACBRI) and the
Logarithmic score (SACLOG). The model is first fit on the training set by run-
ning the sampling step for 3000 iterations of which the first 500 iterations are
used for burn-in. The remaining 2500 observations are thinned by keeping every
fifth observation. The calibration step is performed for the final 500 observa-
tions. The out-of-sample aggregation is done by running the sampling step for
500 iterations with each consecutive iteration reading in and conditioning on the
next value of β and b found during the training period. The first 200 iterations
are used for burn-in. The remaining 300 iterations are thinned by discarding
every other observation, leaving a final posterior sample of 150 observations.
The average of this sample gives the final estimates.
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3. A fully Bayesian version of SACLOG (BSACLOG). Denote the calibrated logit
probabilities and event indicators across all K questions with X(1) and Z,
respectively. The posterior distribution of β conditional on X(1) is given by
p(β|X(1),Z) ∝ p(Z|β,X(1))p(β|X(1)). The likelihood is
p
(
Z|β,X(1))
(6.1)
∝
K∏
k=1
Tk∏
t=1
logit−1
(
Xt,k(1)/β
)Zk (1 − logit−1(Xt,k(1)/β))1−Zk .
As in Gelman et al. (2003), the prior for β is chosen to be locally uniform,
p(1/β) ∝ 1. Given that this model estimates Xt,k(1) and β simultaneously,
it is a little more flexible than SAC. Posterior estimates of β can be sampled
from (6.1) using generic sampling algorithms such as the Metropolis algorithm
[Metropolis et al. (1953)] or slice sampling [Neal (2003)]. Given that the sam-
pling procedure conditions on the event indicators, the full conditional distri-
bution of the hidden states is not in a standard form. Therefore, the Metropo-
lis algorithm is also used for sampling the hidden states. Estimation is made
with the same choices of thinning and burn-in as described under Sample-And-
Calibrate.
4. Due to the lack of previous literature on dynamic aggregation of expert prob-
ability forecasts, the main competitors are exponentially weighted versions of
procedures that have been proposed for static probability aggregation:
(a) Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) as described in Sec-
tion 5.
(b) Exponentially Weighted Moving Logit Aggregator (EWMLA). This is a
moving version of the aggregator pˆG(b) that was introduced in Satopää
et al. (2014a). The EWMLA aggregate probabilities are found recursively
from
pˆt,k(α,b) =
{
G1,k(b), for t = 1,
αGt,k(b) + (1 − α)pˆt−1,k(α,b), for t > 1,
where the vector b ∈RJ collects the bias terms of the expertise groups, and
Gt,k(ν) =
(Nt,k∏
i=1
(
pi,t,k
1 − pi,t,k
)bj (i,k)/Nt,k)/(
1 +
Nt,k∏
i=1
(
pi,t,k
1 − pi,t,k
)bj (i,k)/Nt,k)
.
The parameters α and b are learned from the training set by
(αˆ, bˆ) = arg min
b∈R5,α∈[0,1]
∑
k∈Strain
Tk∑
t=1
(
Zk − pˆt,k(α,b))2.
(c) Exponentially Weighted Moving Beta-transformed Aggregator (EWMBA).
The static version of the Beta-transformed aggregator was introduced in
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Ranjan and Gneiting (2010). A dynamic version can be obtained by replac-
ing Gt,k(ν) in the EWMLA description with Hν,τ (p¯t,k), where Hν,τ is the
cumulative distribution function of the Beta distribution and p¯t,k is given
by (5.1). The parameters α, ν, τ and ω are learned from the training set by
(αˆ, νˆ, τˆ , ωˆ) = arg min
ν,τ>0 α,ωj∈[0,1]
∑
k∈Strain
Tk∑
t=1
(
Zk − pˆt,k(α, ν, τ,ω))2
(6.2)
s.t.
J∑
j=1
ωj = 1.
The competing models are evaluated via a 10-fold cross-validation3 that first
partitions the 166 questions into 10 sets such that each set has approximately the
same number of questions (16 or 17 questions in our case) and the same number
of time points (between 1760 and 1764 time points in our case). The evaluation
then iterates 10 times, each time using one of the 10 sets as the testing set and the
remaining 9 sets as the training set. Therefore, each question is used nine times for
training and exactly once for testing. The testing proceeds sequentially one testing
question at a time as follows: First, for a question with a time horizon of Tk , give an
aggregate probability at time t = 2 based on the first two days. Compute the Brier
score for this probability. Next give an aggregate probability at time t = 3 based
on the first three days and compute the Brier score for this probability. Repeat this
process for all of the Tk − 1 days. This leads to Tk − 1 Brier scores per testing
question and a total of 17,475 Brier scores across the entire data set.
Table 4 summarizes these scores in different ways. The first option, denoted by
Scores by Day, weighs each question by the number of days the question remained
open. This is performed by computing the average of the 17,475 scores. The sec-
ond option, denoted by Scores by Problem, gives each question an equal weight
regardless of how long the question remained open. This is done by first averaging
the scores within a question and then averaging the average scores across all the
questions. Both scores can be further broken down into subcategories by consid-
ering the length of the questions. The final three columns of Table 4 divide the
questions into Short questions (30 days or fewer), Medium questions (between 31
and 59 days) and Long Problems (60 days or more). The number of questions in
these subcategories were 36, 32 and 98, respectively. The bolded scores indicate
the best score in each column. The values in the parenthesis quantify the variabil-
ity in the scores: Under Scores by Day the values give the standard errors of all
the scores. Under Scores by Problem, on the other hand, the values represent the
standard errors of the average scores of the different questions.
3A 5-fold cross-validation was also performed. The results were, however, very similar to the 10-
fold cross-validation and hence not presented in the paper.
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TABLE 4
Brier scores based on 10-fold cross-validation. Scores by Day weighs a question by the number of
days the question remained open. Scores by Problem gives each question an equal weight regardless
of how long the question remained open. The bolded values indicate the best scores in each column.
The values in the parenthesis represent standard errors in the scores
Model All Short Medium Long
Scores by day
SDLM 0.100 (0.156) 0.066 (0.116) 0.098 (0.154) 0.102 (0.157)
BSACLOG 0.097 (0.213) 0.053 (0.147) 0.100 (0.215) 0.098 (0.215)
SACBRI 0.096 (0.190) 0.056 (0.134) 0.097 (0.190) 0.098 (0.192)
SACLOG 0.096 (0.191) 0.056 (0.134) 0.096 (0.189) 0.098 (0.193)
EWMBA 0.104 (0.204) 0.057 (0.120) 0.113 (0.205) 0.105 (0.206)
EWMLA 0.102 (0.199) 0.061 (0.130) 0.111 (0.214) 0.103 (0.200)
EWMA 0.111 (0.146) 0.080 (0.101) 0.116 (0.152) 0.112 (0.146)
Scores by problem
SDLM 0.089 (0.116) 0.064 (0.085) 0.106 (0.141) 0.092 (0.117)
BSACLOG 0.083 (0.160) 0.052 (0.103) 0.110 (0.198) 0.085 (0.162)
SACBRI 0.083 (0.142) 0.055 (0.096) 0.106 (0.174) 0.085 (0.144)
SACLOG 0.082 (0.142) 0.055 (0.096) 0.105 (0.174) 0.085 (0.144)
EWMBA 0.091 (0.157) 0.057 (0.095) 0.121 (0.187) 0.093 (0.164)
EWMLA 0.090 (0.159) 0.064 (0.109) 0.120 (0.200) 0.090 (0.159)
EWMA 0.102 (0.108) 0.080 (0.075) 0.123 (0.130) 0.103 (0.110)
As can be seen in Table 4, SACLOG achieves the lowest score across all columns
except Short where it is outperformed by BSACLOG. It turns out that BSACLOG
is overconfident (see Section 6.3). This means that BSACLOG underestimates the
uncertainty in the events and outputs aggregate probabilities that are typically too
near 0.0 or 1.0. This results into highly variable performance. The short questions
generally involved very little uncertainty. On such easy questions, overconfidence
can pay off frequently enough to compensate for a few large losses arising from
the overconfident and drastically incorrect forecasts.
SDLM, on the other hand, lacks sharpness and is highly underconfident (see
Section 6.3). This behavior is expected, as the experts are underconfident at the
group level (see Section 6.4) and SDLM does not use the training set to explicitly
calibrate its aggregate probabilities. Instead, it merely smooths the forecasts given
by the experts. The resulting aggregate probabilities are therefore necessarily con-
servative, resulting into high average scores with low variability.
Similar behavior is exhibited by EWMA that performs the worst of all the com-
peting models. The other two exponentially weighted aggregators, EWMLA and
EWMBA, make efficient use of the training set and present moderate forecasting
performance in most columns of Table 4. Neither approach, however, appears to
dominate the other. The high variability and average of their performance scores
indicate that their performance suffers from overconfidence.
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FIG. 3. The top and bottom rows show in- and out-of-sample calibration and sharpness, respec-
tively.
6.3. In- and out-of-sample sharpness and calibration. A calibration plot is a
simple tool for visually assessing the sharpness and calibration of a model. The
idea is to plot the aggregate probabilities against the observed empirical frequen-
cies. Therefore, any deviation from the diagonal line suggests poor calibration.
A model is considered underconfident (or overconfident) if the points follow an
S-shaped (or S-shaped) trend. To assess sharpness of the model, it is common
practice to place a histogram of the given forecasts in the corner of the plot. Given
that the data were balanced, any deviation from the the baseline probability of 0.5
suggests improved sharpness.
The top and bottom rows of Figure 3 present calibration plots for SDLM,
SACLOG, SACBRI and BSACLOG under in- and out-of-sample probability aggre-
gation, respectively. Each setting is of interest in its own right: Good in-sample
calibration is crucial for model interpretability. In particular, if the estimated crowd
belief is well calibrated, then the elements of the bias vector b can be used to study
the amount of under or overconfidence in the different expertise groups. Good
out-of-sample calibration and sharpness, on the other hand, are necessary prop-
erties in decision making. To guide our assessment, the dashed bands around the
diagonal connect the point-wise, Bonferroni-corrected [Bonferroni (1936)] 95%
lower and upper critical values under the null hypothesis of calibration. These
have been computed by running the bootstrap technique described in Bröcker and
Smith (2007) for 10,000 iterations. The in-sample predictions were obtained by
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running the models for 10,200 iterations, leading to a final posterior sample of
1000 observations after thinning and using the first 200 iterations for burn-in. The
out-of-sample predictions were given by the 10-fold cross-validation discussed in
Section 6.2.
Overall, SAC is sharp and well calibrated both in- and out-of-sample with only
a few points barely falling outside the point-wise critical values. Given that the
calibration does not change drastically from the top to the bottom row, SAC can be
considered robust against overfitting. This, however, is not the case with BSACLOG
that is well calibrated in-sample but presents overconfidence out-of-sample. Fig-
ure 3(a) and (e) serve as baselines by showing the calibration plots for SDLM.
Given that this model does not perform any explicit calibration, it is not surpris-
ing to see most points outside the critical values. The pattern in the deviations
suggests strong underconfidence. Furthermore, the inset histogram reveals drastic
lack of sharpness. Therefore, SAC can be viewed as a well-performing compro-
mise between SDLM and BSACLOG that avoids overconfidence without being too
conservative.
6.4. Group-level expertise bias. This section explores the bias among the five
expertise groups in our data set. Figure 4 compares the posterior distributions of the
individual elements of b with side-by-side boxplots. Given that the distributions
fall completely below the no-bias reference line at 1.0, all the expertise groups
are deemed underconfident. Even though the exact level of underconfidence is
affected slightly by the extent to which the extreme probabilities are censored (see
Section 6.1), the qualitative results in this section remain insensitive to different
levels of censoring.
Figure 4 shows that underconfidence decreases as expertise increases. The pos-
terior probability that the most expert group is the least underconfident is approx-
imately equal to 1.0, and the posterior probability of a strictly decreasing level of
underconfidence is approximately 0.87. The latter probability is driven down by
the inseparability of the two groups with the lowest levels of self-reported exper-
tise. This inseparability suggests that the experts are poor at assessing how little
they know about a topic that is strange to them. If these groups are combined into
a single group, the posterior probability of a strictly decreasing level of undercon-
fidence is approximately 1.0.
The decreasing trend in underconfidence can be viewed as a process of Bayesian
updating. A completely ignorant expert aiming to minimize a reasonable loss func-
tion, such as the Brier score, has no reason to give anything but 0.5 as his probabil-
ity forecast. However, as soon as the expert gains some knowledge about the event,
he produces an updated forecast that is a compromise between his initial forecast
and the new information acquired. The updated forecast is therefore conservative
and too close to 0.5 as long as the expert remains only partially informed about the
event. If most experts fall somewhere on this spectrum between ignorance and full
information, their average forecast tends to fall strictly between 0.5 and the most
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FIG. 4. Posterior distributions of bj for j = 1, . . . ,5.
informed probability forecast [see Baron et al. (2014) for more details]. Given that
expertise is to a large extent determined by subject matter knowledge, the level of
underconfidence can be expected to decrease as a function of the group’s level of
self-reported expertise.
Finding underconfidence in all the groups may seem like a surprising result
given that many previous studies have shown that experts are often overconfi-
dent [see, e.g., Bier (2004), Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Phillips (1977), Morgan
(1992) for a summary of numerous calibration studies]. It is, however, worth em-
phasizing three points: First, our result is a statement about groups of experts and
hence does not invalidate the possibility of the individual experts being overconfi-
dent. To make conclusions at the individual level based on the group level bias
terms would be considered an ecological inference fallacy [see, e.g., Lubinski
and Humphreys (1996)]. Second, the experts involved in our data set are over-
all very well calibrated [Mellers et al. (2014)]. A group of well-calibrated ex-
perts, however, can produce an aggregate forecast that is underconfident. In fact,
if the aggregate is linear, the group is necessarily underconfident [see Theorem 1
of Ranjan and Gneiting (2010)]. Third, according to Erev, Wallsten and Budescu
(1994), the level of confidence depends on the way the data were analyzed. They
explain that experts’ probability forecasts suggest underconfidence when the fore-
casts are averaged or presented as a function of independently defined objective
probabilities, that is, the probabilities given by logit−1(Xt,k) in our case. This is
similar to our context and opposite to many empirical studies on confidence cali-
bration.
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6.5. Question difficulty and other measures. One advantage of our model
arises from its ability to produce estimates of interpretable question-specific pa-
rameters γk , σ 2k and τ 2k . These quantities can be combined in many interesting
ways to answer questions about different groups of experts or the questions them-
selves. For instance, being able to assess the difficulty of a question could lead to
more principled ways of aggregating performance measures across questions or to
novel insight on the kinds of questions that are found difficult by experts [see, e.g.,
a discussion on the Hard-Easy Effect in Wilson (1994)]. To illustrate, recall that
higher values of σ 2k suggest greater disagreement among the participating experts.
Given that experts are more likely to disagree over a difficult question than an easy
one, it is reasonable to assume that σ 2k has a positive relationship with question
difficulty. An alternative measure is given by τ 2k that quantifies the volatility of the
underlying circumstances that ultimately decide the outcome of the event. There-
fore, a high value of τ 2k can cause the outcome of the event to appear unstable and
difficult to predict.
As a final illustration of our model, we return to the two example questions
introduced in Figure 1. Given that σˆ 2k = 2.43 and σˆ 2k = 1.77 for the questions
depicted in Figure 1(a) and 1(b), respectively, the first question provokes more
disagreement among the experts than the second one. Intuitively this makes sense
because the target event in Figure 1(a) is determined by several conditions that may
change radically from one day to the next while the target event in Figure 1(b) is
determined by a relatively steady stock market index. Therefore, it is not surprising
to find that in Figure 1(a) τˆ 2k = 0.269, which is much higher than τˆ 2k = 0.039 in
Figure 1(b). We may conclude that the first question is inherently more difficult
than the second one.
7. Discussion. This paper began by introducing a rather unorthodox but
nonetheless realistic time-series setting where probability forecasts are made very
infrequently by a heterogeneous group of experts. The resulting data is too sparse
to be modeled well with standard time-series methods. In response to this lack of
appropriate modeling procedures, we propose an interpretable time-series model
that incorporates self-reported expertise to capture a sharp and well-calibrated es-
timate of the crowd belief. This procedure extends the forecasting literature into
an under-explored area of probability aggregation.
Our model preserves parsimony while addressing the main challenges in mod-
eling sparse probability forecasting data. Therefore, it can be viewed as a basis for
many future extensions. To give some ideas, recall that most of the model param-
eters were assumed constant over time. It is intuitively reasonable, however, that
these parameters behave differently during different time intervals of the question.
For instance, the level of disagreement (represented by σ 2k in our model) among
the experts can be expected to decrease toward the final time point when the ques-
tion resolves. This hypothesis could be explored by letting σ 2t,k evolve dynamically
as a function of the previous term σ 2t−1,k and random noise.
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This paper modeled the bias separately within each expertise group. This is
by no means restricted to the study of bias or its relation to self-reported expertise.
Different parameter dependencies could be constructed based on many other expert
characteristics, such as gender, education or specialty, to produce a range of novel
insights on the forecasting behavior of experts. It would also be useful to know how
expert characteristics interact with question types, such as economic, domestic or
international. The results would be of interest to the decision-maker who could use
the information as a basis for hiring only a high-performing subset of the available
experts.
Other future directions could remove some of the obvious limitations of our
model. For instance, recall that the random components are assumed to follow
a normal distribution. This is a strong assumption that may not always be justi-
fied. Logit probabilities, however, have been modeled with the normal distribution
before [see, e.g., Erev, Wallsten and Budescu (1994)]. Furthermore, the normal
distribution is a rather standard assumption in psychological models [see, e.g.,
signal-detection theory in Tanner, Wilson and Swets (1954)].
A second limitation resides in the assumption that both the observed and hid-
den processes are expected to grow linearly. This assumption could be relaxed,
for instance, by adding higher order terms to the model. A more complex model,
however, is likely to sacrifice interpretability. Given that our model can detect very
intricate patterns in the crowd belief (see Figure 1), compromising interpretability
for the sake of facilitating nonlinear growth is hardly necessary.
A third limitation appears in an online setting where new forecasts are received
at a fast rate. Given that our model is fit in a retrospective fashion, it is necessary to
refit the model every time a new forecast becomes available. Therefore, our model
can be applied only to offline aggregation and online problems that tolerate some
delay. A more scalable and efficient alternative would be to develop an aggrega-
tor that operates recursively on streams of forecasts. Such a filtering perspective
would offer an aggregator that estimates the current crowd belief accurately with-
out having to refit the entire model each time a new forecast arrives. Unfortunately,
this typically implies being less accurate in estimating the model parameters such
as the bias term. However, as estimation of the model parameters was addressed
in this paper, designing a filter for probability forecasts seems like the next natural
development in time-series probability aggregation.
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